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Thank you very much General Cabral Couto, General Loureiro dos 
Santos, my good friend Admirai Narciso Duro, Ambassador Briggs, olher 
distinguished Ambassadors and very distinguished guests, fellow military 
officers and members of Ihis Institute. 
Firs! of allle! me apologize to you for coming in!o Ihis beautiful country 
and speaking in my language and not yours. lI's one of my inadequacies, 
and I hope you will bear with me. 
I! is indeed a distinct pleasure for me to return to Lisbon on a special 
occasion, one in which we celebrate 25 years of service by lhe IBERLANT 
command, commanded by Admirai Duro under our NA TO Alliance. I also 
welcome this particular opportunity to address the distinguished membership 
Df the National Defense Institute. 
I believe Ihat in a world that is undergoing historie and revolutionary 
transformation, it is important that we who are committed to the defense res-
ponsibiJities of our various nations continuously explore and discuss lhe impor-
tant criticai issues of the Western Alliance and our individual national needs 
Here at the National Defense Institute, you are afforded this opportunity 
to research and analyze these criticai security issues. Rare indeed, in my 
experience, is the opportunity to do Ihis, devoid of the routine distractions 
that precJude our professions from spending as much time as these issues 
deserve. 
I envy you that luxury and I hope that my transatlantic views on maritime 
issues, affecting our NATO alliance and a few comments on the U.S. - Portu-
guese bilateral defense relationship may be relevant to your study and 
understanding of the change going on around uso 
(*) Conferência proferida ao CDN92, em 25 de Fevereiro de 1992, pelo Almirante 
SACLANT Leon A. Edney. 
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It was Ihis monlh, forly years ago, Ihal lhe Foreign Ministers of our 
Nato member states met here, in Lisbon, to finalize lhe ground tUles of 
a new alliance called NATO. As you can imagine, that agreemenl did not 
come easily. But the archilecls of lhe basic sltUctural and organizational 
foundation of our alliance did an exceptional job. Of ali lhe mullinational 
defense alliances entered into since World War !l, loday only NATO remains 
viable and relevant to lhe world around uso 
ln my judgment, Ihis conlinuity is a resuIt of lhe NATO alIiance having 
been formed and built upon lhe principIes of mutual cooperalion, mutual 
reiforcement, and mutual respecl and friendship. Today, NATO stands 
out as a malure, credible, defensive alliance of sovereign nations whose 
purpose remains lO foster inslitulions of democralic process, dialogue and 
cooperation which will lead to growth and stability, while at the same lime 
providing lhe deterrence for any possible securily Ihreat lO our membcr 
nalions. And we do this through a combined military strength of our individual 
nalions. Never in this century has lhe world experienced such a period of 
rapid and unpredietable change. The Eastern Europe counlries of the former 
Warsaw Pact and lhe republics of lhe formeI' Soviel Union are undergoing 
massive, politicaI, social and economic transformations. It is reassuring that 
on every continent we see ir nol lhe triumph, lhe emergence of democratic 
principIes, principIes Ihat increase the voiee of the people and concern for 
human righls. We see change that offers a hope for a new world, a new world 
order that brings whith it the hope of peace. But we also have amongst us loday 
great instability, and great potential for miscalculations and conflicting inte-
rests that could affect our security. 
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of democratic governments 
that are representatives of the voice of the people, in my judgement was 
achieved by the constaney of the Western AlIiance commitment to mutual 
seeurity and defense of our naticnal values. 
I hope that you in this audienee take a special feeling of warmth and 
pride in your contribution to that accomplishment. For over forty-two years, 
this alliance has born lhe ccst of freedom and has served as a beacon for those 
who sought politicaI freedom, human rights and more economie opportunities. 
Today, we are witnessing the positive resuIts of our vigilance and our 
commitmenl. I would say to you that while we should applaud the end 
of the cold war and the emergence of these democratic principIes, we must 
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remain alert to the great instabilities created by these transformations of the 
rapidly changing world scene. 
We see today the new Commonwealth of Independent States, formerly 
the Soviet Union, together with the Baltic states and the Eastern Europeans 
struggling with massive internal failures, and in many of the emergent demo· 
cracies there are factors working against the success of this democratic 
processo Democratic traditions are weak and in some countries they are non-
-existent. The basic fact is that the inability to distribute goods, ar provide 
the basics of shelter, food, jobs and health care for their people are providing 
hard tests for these nations. 
We have seen Yugoslavia degenerate into civil war, emerging with new 
republics but at great cost to their people and their life style. There is a 
widespread concern, in many of our nations, that this sarne trauma approa-
ching civil war could occur among many of the former Soviet republics that 
are more heavily armed. And we certainly need only to look at the face of the 
shocked and desillusioned Russian shoppers and the headlines of our papers, 
people that are experiencing the first wave of price increases, to realize that the 
ultimate success of democracy in Russia and any of these emerging nations 
cannot be taken for granted and will take our best help and effort. 
It is in this environment that I see the continued vitaly and relevance of 
our NATO alliance. I give NATO good grades for its responsiveness to the 
pace of change that has exceeded everyone's imagination in the last two to 
there years. ln the last year alone, our alliance - with a degree of urgency 
that took countless meetings, dozens of document drafts and an umparaIlel 
degree of cooperation - has agreed and endorsed at the Rome summit a 
new stategic concept. This was foIlowed weeks later by the publishing 01 
a new military stategy, one that was implemented through the military 
committee. 
And simultaneously, the major NATO commanders, myself, Admirai 
Slater and General Jack Galvin, working with our staffs, have developed 
new force concepts and associated force structures. At the sarne time, we 
undertook efforts to revise the readiness and availability, make them relevant 
to today's world. And we have embarked on a comprehensive command 
structure review which will change and downgrade and reduce the size of that 
structure. I think anyone would say that it is an amazingly productive and 
successful year for NATO. 
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Today we look at a changing world even in my area of responsibilily. We 
are not focusing on the battIe of the AtIantic, wc are looking at an overarching 
maritime force structure that has been adjusted to support this recently 
approved new NA TO strategy. We are reaffirming within the Alliance our 
commitment to a common defense, where an attack on one is an attack on ali. 
The new strategy validates NATO's role as a defensive alliance. We 
have no objectives on anyone else's territory. Our primary objective is to 
maintain a credible deterrence to conventional and nuclear threats, to our 
individual and collective security. As much progress as we have made, we 
still live in a nuclear world. 
ln this regard, we have also committed that the linkage between Europe 
and North America remains essential to this defense alliance. We also have 
acknowledged that we, in the alliance, welcome a stranger European defense 
identity, referred to by some as the «European pillat». 
This will entail multinational integrated force structures - and hopefully 
it will include more clearly defined arrangements for complementarity between 
the emerging European economie communities, with security identity being 
identified to the Western European Union and our alliance. The challenge 
is to accomplish this within alliance objectives, while maintaining the viability 
of the North American Jinkage. 
Within these broad objectives, NATO will continue to seek improved 
cooperation and increased dialogue to achive a whole and free Europe. We 
will seek peaceful solutions to world problems and we will seek additional 
progress in the area of arms reductions. While contributing to stable, peaceful 
conditions, NATO must keep its guard up against the proJiferation of high 
technology weapons of mass destructÍon. Not only nuclear weapons but chemi-
cal and biological. We must maintain a credible capacity to regenerate conven-
tional and if needed nuclear forces sufficient to deter and defeat any coalition 
wieh might seek to challenge our security. 
For the short and mid-term, in my judgement, crisis response will increase 
in relevancy and focus within NATO's governing body. To be responsive to 
this environment, the three major NATO commanders have generated a 
maritime forces working group to develop a series of force slructures, wieh 
represent graduated response leveis in this new world enviranment. These 
broad structures have been agreed upon by ali of the NATO major 
commanders and I characterize them as reaction main defense and augmen-
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tation forces. They also harmonize with the new force structures being gene-
rated by Allied Command Europe, under General Galvin's leadership. 
I think it is important to examine a number of the facts which govern 
both the design of these future maritime forces and their implementation. It 
provides a variety of force leveis built on the strength of ali our collective 
nations and it is required that these forces be able to respond across the 
spectrum of peacetime presence and surveillance, crisis, and hopefully to deter, 
but if required to respond, to conflict. 
ln doing this, NATO requires sufficient force leveis to react to a crisis 
in one part of the alliance, while maintaining adequate presence and response 
capabilities to security in ali areas of alliance interest. That simply means 
that from a maritime perspective our interests in our area of operations go 
from the Bering Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, from the Western coast 
of Portugal to the East coast of North America. 
These alliance maritime forces, while primarily regionally based, must 
be able to deploy in NATO areas wherever the situation requires, and 
training must demonstrate and exercise this capability. And through this 
process we will demonstrate the inter-operability of NATO task groups, task 
forces and expanded task forces. We must have a robust exercise program, 
including routine training in the environmentally demanding North Atlantie, 
the Norwegian Sea, and certainly the approach to Gibraltar as represented by 
Iberlant's area command. 
Greater reliance will be placed on sea Iift, associated with build-up 
and resupply of forces required to respond to crisis management and any 
major threat. Over 90% of the massive amount of goods that were supporting 
the UN initiative in the Persian Gulf went by sea. 
And this portends a continuing requirement for maritime forces to surveil 
and protect those sea Iines of communicaticns. The «shopping menu» approach, 
inherent in the new marítime force structure, will allow timely response 
wíth multinational maritime forces to go to a crisis area with the right mix 
of military capabilities. It will also allow additional forces, in direct ar 
indirect support, to support associated tasks. These tasks include providing 
surveillance in monitoring the approach to a crisis area, and to protect the 
sea Iines of communications. 
Tha! was dane, for NATO interest, during in au out-of-area involvement 
in the Persian Gulf. Throughout the Mediterranean we were providing - with 
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NATO forces - surveillance and presence. Should someone have decided 
to execute what we did not take as an idle threat fram Saddam Hussein, 
that terrorism would be expanded throughout our area of interes!. 
Terrorism is something we cannot ignore and we do not accept, and 
our forces were ready to respondo Luckily we did not have to. We also need 
forces to escort and protect the sea lifl and the logistic support for the 
shipping that is vital to this concept. 
And as everyone knows in today's warfare, lhe mine is a very cheap 
equalizer: it's easy to make and it's easy to deploy. We need adequate and 
sufficient anli-mine measures to protect the shores of our own nations and 
the interest of our aIliance. We also must be able to maintain praficiency in 
submarine warfare - that which goes on under the sea - and anti-air warfare 
You cannot prevail in modern warfare without air superiority. We must be 
able to do this not only at the scene of the action but in the choke points: Gi-
braltar is a choke point, passing the straits of Sicily is a choke point and even 
the Baltics are choke points. 
And choke points can be made depending on your area interest. Certainly 
the Suez Cannal is a choke poin!. These rapid reaction forces will be 
supplemented by main defense forces, designed to supplement and provide 
sustainability when a crisis is escalated to a point that a potential for hostilities 
exist, ar we need prolonged sustainment of these reaction forces to maintain 
the pressure below that of violence. These forces should be in sufficient 
numbers and capabilities to contain be crisis and prevent hostilities. 
As with reaction forces, main defense forces will require additional 
units to specific are tasking. I share these things because ali of our nations 
are looking at a reduclion of forces and it's going to take more and more 
coordination and consultation to make sure lhat we emphasize the strengths 
and not duplicate our strengths but fill the holes where we have some 
shortcomings. 
Finally, the maritime augmentation forces are comprised by balance 
of alliance naval forces - we call them reserve forces in my country - forces 
that can be maintained at a lower state of availability and readiness, but 
that are there to respond if the crisis in the world environment is turning 
to its major confrontation. 
I want to share with you this morning, that as a major naval commander, 
it was simpler to define the old concept of employing maritime forces, ar 
any force for lhat malter. A concept of employment wich had a very well-
60 
NATO AND ITS NEW STRATEGY 
-defined threat, we knew who enemy was, we knew where his base land 
was. To defend against it was not easy but it was straightforward. 
We now find ourselves in a much more dificult, although favorable 
position of having no identifiable major tbreat to this aillance's collective 
security. Now the challenge is to define a concept of operations, designed 
to protect the peace and respond to potencial security risks which wilI 
be multifaceted and multidirectional in nature. 
And finaIly, we must retain the capability to successfuIly defend the 
aIliance against the potential of a major attack by new coalitions using war-
-fighting capabilities that exist today. The concept of operations that I'm 
talking about envisions !WO graduated corps of multinational forces that 
wilI react as reaction forces in times of crisis. 
They are standing naval forces which we caIl Standing Naval Forces 
AtIantic, long and loyally participated in by the Portuguese naval forces, 
and the recentIy created Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean. ln times 
of crisis, these can be built up simply by adding eruisers, aireraft carriers 
and 50 forth with the shopping menu approach available to apply to the crisis. 
These forces have regional titIes to them: Atlantic and Mediterranean. 
They wilI be based there for reasons of convenience of command and contraI. 
But they must be able to operate in alI areas of water relevant to this aIliance. 
And they also wilI be able to be supplemented by national units representing 
the individual national security climates of the aIliance but available also 
to the alliance in times of crisis. 
N ow, these !wO forces may also be supplemented by the main defense 
forces which then would be either directed North ar South, depending on 
where the crisis is going. And augmentation forces mentionted earlier would be 
held in reserve. 
This concept of operations aIlows you more flexibility and allows you to 
develop an over-arching, non-threat specific framework. We are not pointing 
towards any specific enemy. We are taking out the reference ... there is no 
Soviet Union and we don't refere to the Russians, we are not training against the 
Russians, we are training against milítary capabilities that exist today in case 
they end up in the hands of someone who chooses to threaten uso 
Activation of these multinational maritime forces could be requested by 
a major NATO commander, an individual NATO nation, ar the NATO 
military committee. The importanee in the strength of our alliance is that 
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the aplication and approval for the use of any these forces must be appro-
ved by the North Atlantie Council. 
And The North Atlantic Council, as you know, is a Council of 16 nations 
that operates through consensus. So wonderful, and yet is a complex 
operation. And the voice of Portugal 01' the voiee of Iceland who has no 
defenses are the sarne as the voiees of Spain or France, UK 01' the United 
States. That's the strength of this great Alliance. 
Adequate logistie support is something that we must pay more altention 
to. It will be crucial to the successful implementation of new maritime forces. 
The concept, as weU as the application. Remember the objective of this 
aUiance is to deter confliet. If you are going to deter conflict, you have to 
be able to convince people that you mean what you say if your security 
interests are threatened. That means that we have to pay more attention not 
only to sea lift, but lo the logistic support of oi! supplies. The AUiance needs 
more emphasis on oilers, what we call the gas stations to the flee!. We need 
a commitment to float as well as to shore forward base logistics, specifically 
to be able lo do ship and airerafl repairs overseas. You have a wonderful 
facility here in Portugal, one of the 10p leading tecnological capabilities that 
I have seen in the world, in OGMA. We need to be able to manufacture repa ir 
and spare parts and make ship repairs if we are to put mcat into the substance 
of this concep!. 
And the NATO maritime training cycle needs to be modified to reflect 
training requirements of the envisoned multinalional forces. I would envision 
lhat they would be stretched over a longer period of time, and so lhat the 
NATO expanded task force - which is multiple carrier operations - would 
t"ke place every three years, every 36 months. Operations with carrier task 
forces, NATO carrier task forces, every eighteen months and then lhe more 
normal task group of six to seven ships would lake place on an annual 
basis. This is not done to be generated towards any threat; it is done because 
of the need to praclice interoperability, communications, to make sure your 
radars interact and don't interfere with one another. And the recognition Ihal 
ali our armed forces are young armed forces, that there is great turnover, so 
that what you practiee three years from now is done with different people 
and, in many cases, differenl ships. Only by thal commitment do you have a 
credible force. 
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Similarly, we must be willing to practice command force exercises and 
!ive training exercises that interact between the military and the civilian 
leadership who are going to be making the decisions, and have to understand 
more about the concept that I am talking abou!. We have to understand the 
tactics as weU as the doctrine that support our aUiance, We must not just 
exercise for exercise's sake. While the future cannot be predicted, NATO must 
accept and adopt to the rea!ities of what has happened. The dismemberment 
of the Soviet Union as we know it is permanen!. Our military requirement to 
maintain a balance against the residual soviet, now-russian threat, is of less 
urgency. As each day passes we continue to see the disintegration of the forces 
of our formeI' adversary and we are reaching out with sincere friendship. One 
Ihing is certain: the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union will not reconstitute. 
Russia and the Confederation of Independent States bring different force 
structures and different coa!itions to bear on the issue. II is our chaUenge 
within this aUiance and our friendship of nations to make thal a successful 
transition and welcome Ihem into the community of produclive free nations. 
No one however, can safely predict how this will tum ou!. The insta-
bility in the world and potential for regional conflict remain high and Iheyare 
not going to lessen in the next five lo ten years. It is stiU a dangerous world 
out there. Some people in my country and the Congress - I will be testifying 
before our Senate Armed Forces Committee when I go back the States 
early next week - are asking the question, because of the desire to put their 
funds in other areas that desperately need funds also: why do we need 
so many armed forces? They are asking us to justify our existence. I don't 
lee! Ihat is necessary at aH. AH you have to do is read the daily newpapers. 
Today, as I speak, there are thirty-five open conflicts being fought around 
the world. Ten nations have confirmed stockpiles of chemical-biological 
weapons and the means to deliver them. Ten to fifteen nations possess, 01' 
are approaching the possession, of nuclear weapon capability, and thirty-two 
nations currently possess baUistic missiles that could carry these weapons 
of mass destruction two of these are in the underdeveloped nations category 
and they cannot be categorized as friendly to Weslem industrial nations 01' 
lhe interest of world peace. That is why wc must remember that the first 
primary responsibility of a free society is to defend thal freedom. 
The newest and mosl pressing concem is that the nuclear technology 
expertise of the formeI' Soviet Union could very possibly faU into the hands 
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of the highest bidder able to purchase these materiais and services. And so 
I would share with you today that no one should have to wonder what the 
relevance of NATO is. I do not see a kindler, gentler world out there. Rather, 
I see a world that continues to validate the need for credible collective 
defense forces, collective security alliances, and NATO is at the head of that 
c1ass. 
We need NATO to protect our collective interest in a world that is 
increasingly unstable. Therefore, the crisis response capability of this 
alliance is important; what we do with that capability is a choice of decision 
and responsibility for our civilian leadership. But I would argue that military 
preparedness to deliver trained credible forces to a crisis must be addressed 
by this aIliance with a sense of urgency. The new strategy that we envisioned 
just two years ago, we envisioned it evolving over a period, and we were 
talking about 1995 and beyond. And yet, as we ali knc.w, it is here now. It 
is a strategy of today. From the perspective of my professional responsibilities, 
it is a luxury to know your enemy, to study his tactics and train to take 
advantage of his weaknesses. We did this and we did this well vis-a-vis the 
Soviets for over forty-one years. Now the challenge is to train to capabilities 
and be ready to deter unknown adversaries. This is a much more difficult 
challenge. It takes a lot more commitment to keep that resolve. 
There is a great deal of work to do, particularly on the maritime side 
where my interest lies. There is slill much of a tendency, in my experience 
among naval officers, to assume that we have always been operating with 
multinational forces, we have always operatitng in the sea, and that the sea 
never changes. So what is new? If you have that opinion and you are wearing 
a naval uniform, you have got the wrong opinion. There is an urgent need 
for us to define new concepts that are relevant to this strategy that I have 
been talking about, and responsive to crisis-management issues. There is an 
urgent need to make our civilian Jeadership aware of what the true flexibility 
and mobility of naval forces are. We must move on and implement the forces 
that bring about tbis concept and we must be able to provide credible forces 
to bear on any particular problem that our civilian leadership chooses to 
exercise. 
We, as the major NATO commanders, need to identify the holes that 
exist in our planning to date, and fill those holes. ln my judgement, this should 
focus on three primary areas: first and foremost is the applicability of new 
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command and control arrangements. This is a difficuIt one because NATO is 
a politicai alliance and we do a lot of strange things, politicaIly, to stroke each 
other's egos. But I want to teIl you as a military caromander that the test of 
command and control is on the battIe field. And it must be simple and 
uncomplicated, and it must serve the battIefield commander's interests and 
not the interests of egos. And so we must put more focus on this and we must 
ensure that it works. 
Secondly, we must ensure the adequacy of the required forces to execute 
the tasks assigned, and thirdly, we must train, we must exercise, to make sure 
that if you ever need the application of force we artive with ready capable 
forces, able to acomplish the mission you assign. We still need to do low-
-levei f1ights; we stiII need to do complex landings in an amphibious envi-
ronment; we stiII need to do integrated air operations if we're going to be 
successful. 
The new strategy incIudes maintenance of smaIler more flexible and 
mobile forces. It sounds simple, but "the devi! is in the detail". The long-term 
commitment of NA TO to maintain crisis response forces for our stability 
is essential to our survival as free nations. 
Let me make one more point on training exereises. We are going out to 
do an exereise in just !wo weeks up in Norway. Some people ask: "why are 
you doing it?" We are not training against Russian capabilities, we are train-
ing for the interoperability, the complexness of communicating with nations 
from ali of our aIliance and the complexity of integrating air support, sea 
support, and amphibious forces ashore. We are working with the reserve 
forces of Norway, NetherIands, U. S., Denmark, and alI of the forces of our 
marítime forces. That is why in the Persian GuIf, no matter how the forces 
got there - they got there in response of the United Nations - but when 
they got there it was the training provided by this aIliance that aIlowed them 
to be so successful. We must not forget that. 
FinaIly, I want to share wíth you one last thought and that is that with 
increased emphasis on regional instability and crisis management, the bi·lateral 
defense agreements that evolve out of our wonderful NATO assoeiations are 
equally important. The United States and Portugal are charter members 
of NATO and they are charter members of this close mutual friendship. The 
US and Portugal, over a long period of time, have shared bilateral usage 
agreements concerning the Portuguese air facilities at Lajes. The strategic 
importance of Lajes in supporting resupply and logistic support from the 
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United States and North America should be obvious in the concept and 
the context of the new strategy I talked about. 
We vaIue the longstanding joint usage agreements. Agreemenls thal are 
based on the good will and the friensWp between our people and the leaders 
of our two nations. Our two nations today are in the process of renegotiating 
the defense and cooperation agreements that enable us joint usage. I persa-
nally look forward to advancing this beneficial bilateral relationship. 
ln the process we must adapt to the realities of the changed environment 
that I have been talking about today. We are talking aboul an environment 
of decreasing defense budgets, decreasing forces, changing applications. We 
will have smaller defense forces, and we must be more efective in sharing our 
individuaI and collective defense contributions to the total benefit of this 
alliance and our individual needs, as I have been talking abou!. It is a complex 
and dificult issue. There is a strong feeling by many in the United States 
that it is time to spend less on defense and seek more mature relationships 
vis-a-vis mutual benefits, shared by overseas parlners. 
One thing is sure: the United States is reducing 30% of our forces 
and that inc1udes our people, our equipment and our supporting overhead. 
Every base in the United States and overseas will share the impact of this 
reduction. There is going to be less presence - some people call that the 
peace dividendo I'm not so quick to call it a peace dividend, but it is a fact 
of rea!ity. 
And this means that there are going to be fewer jobs to support the 
presence that we have had for the last 42 years. TWs is one of the rea!ities 
of the peace divident. It's difficult, it's hard to do no malter where you are. 
There are eight sWpyards tha! support my N avy. For the funding that we 
have got, if you take 30% - and I have to have a quality force at the 
end tha! i! is smaller - we have to shu! down two shipyards. Now, I want 
!o !ell you, when you shu! down the Philadelphia navy shipyard it cos!s 
eight thousand jobs. And eight thousand jobs is a lo! of jobs, and that's direct 
jobs, that is not talking abou! the supporting industries that feed and care 
and fill out the other needs. So this type of negotiation is going on throughout 
the United States, and i!'s going on thtoughout Europe. We are out of the 
Philippines and the ptogress is difficult. 
What I've been talking about is a highet levei of importance. That is the 
challange of free societies. To reditect the amount of effort that you pu! into 
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defense, if you are lucky enough to put it where it belongs, and there is not 
one in this audience thal wouldn't rather be improving olher things. My 
country certainly has tremendous needs to improve the quality of live for 
cur poor, our educalion, our health care, our environrnent. And we have to 
be able to make the transition and not hang On to a job, because when the 
need for a job goes away we have to be able to redirect. 
My commitment, and my plea is that we understand these issues, and 
we do it in a manner that is not divisive to the fundamental strength of our 
alliance which is the commitment and simi1arity of our friendship and our 
freedom and our heritage. It is a very, very important issue and it is a very 
complex one and it affects the lives of local and even national politics. And it 
does gel emolional. But I can teU you that it is best done in an open dialogue, 
with open planning and seeking better understanding with aU concemed. 
These issues that I'm taIking about are separate from base rights negotia-
tions but they tend to get entangled due to the emotions in the lives of those 
involved. Fven if we had no base negotiations, a 30% reduction in forces 
in my country is going to go on and when you do that you have to reduce 
presence and it's going to affect jobs. To combine the two is a disservice. But 
the emotions will be there: I am a realist, not an idealist. I simply commit 
to you the difficulty of the chanlIenge. We need to meet this chaUenge and 
maintain the good relationships that are the foundation of our friendship 
and our alliance. 
From my perspective, it is primari1y the changes in the central front 
of Europe and the land map of Europe that have been so dynamic in the 
last Iwo years. The fundamental mission of aUiance naval forces remains 
- and in fact, in my judgement, may increase. Because NATO remains an 
allíance of free and independent nations, nations that depend on trade and 
free access to foreign markels. And they do this by the sea lanes of the world. 
Our coUective nations depend for the quality of life, on freedom of lhe 
sea. The southern fIank of NATO - which you are on the gateway lo 
- remains an essential part of this lifeline. And, therefore, IBERLANT will 
remain an essential part of Ihis aUiance. Because everything that passes through 
the southern fIank passes through IBERLANT waters. And therefore, the 
geostrategic importance of the Atlantic in the approach to the Mediterranean 
has not diminished, and will not diminish. And we must remain focused 
on the training and credibility and readiness of forces assigned to IBERLANT. 
ln the final analysis I would say to you that the naval forces will continue 
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to be among tbe most acceptable and versatile forms of military presence in 
an area of crisis management. Because they convey calculated ambiguity, 
calculated response. Their presence on tbe high seas does not violate anyone's 
law. They don't commit the nation to any specific act, or any course of action. 
There are no boundaries when you sai! across the seas. The choices for 
the use of naval forces are varied, and they are many. ln fact they are unique, 
because there is no permission required to ply these waters. Naval forces can 
stay on station as long as you need if they have those oilers I was talking 
about. And they also can be withdrawn on a moments notice. They are 
vehicles of people-to-people diplomacy. Visiting ports, I often say to my army 
friends it's hard to have a friendly visit by a batallion of main batde tanks 
We do it ali tbe time with our ships. And naval forces maximize NATO's 
options while contributing to stability and contributing to peace, contributing 
to friendship and understanding. 
We, in the Westem alliance have arrived at this significant era and 
world history because of the consistency of our commitment and tbe rightness 
of our cause. And our cause is freedom and our purpose and our intent is 
collective security of that freedom. We accept and welcome tbe fact tbat the 
world has changed and that tbe overwhelming military threat poised by the 
Soviet Union has disappeared. We welcome their hand of friendship, we 
welcome their reduction of nuclear weapons. I am pleased that by April there 
will be no more tactical nuclear weapons on any US ships. That's a pleasing 
fact for me and tha!'s a part of the resull of the commitment of this alliance. 
To accomplish tbis, and maintain tbis, we need the multinational defense 
forces of tbis alliance to prove in truth that peace through strength should 
not be abandoned, and we should not confuse tbat issue. 
I will close by saying that I personally agree with an observation that 
President Harry Truman once made. That is that "the only history that it is of 
no value is tbe history we forget". 
I thank you for tbis opportunity to share a few views witb you tbis 
moming and will be glad to take questions if you have any at this time. 
QUESTIONS 
Q: On tbe cornmand and control change that is occuring in NATO do 
you see any impact on our area of interest, Iberlant? 
A: No, I don't see any changes in the Iberlant area at tbis time, although 
we have not formalized the major change which needs to take place, that 
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is we are moving from three major NATO commands, SACLANT, SACEUR 
AND CINCCHAN to two major NATO commands, SACEUR and 
SACLANT. ln this process we are now trying to reach agreement, we have 
agreement within the Alliance on the southem command area which wilI 
remain about the same as it is today. The central command area which will be 
focused generalIy around a totalIy unified Germany with Demnark in that 
central front and then a new AFNORTHWEST command that includes 
Norway and the U. K., and the Baltics in the North Sea as a connecting 
link. So tha!'s the major focus that is going on, and how do you do that 
complex process of taking down the old CINCHAN struture and reforming 
it so that alI of the nations feel that they are adequately represented. 
What I continue to see is IBERLANT playing a major role in the 
transition between the AtIantic and the Southem flank, which is the Medi-
terranean and an increasingly important area. I am not able to predict 
where the future is going to go, but one thing that the future is going to 
entai! is that Afriea has got to come as a continent into a more stable 
environment. HopefulIy it wilI do that in a peacefuI manner but there is great 
potential for lots of conflict. Once again the IBERLANT waters are a focal 
point of transition. Wou can't get to any area of the alliance with the 
exception of the far north without entering the IBERLANT area. So I 
do not see and I have no plans for a reduction of the IBERLANT 
significance to the AtIantic Command or as a transitory point, through Gibral-
tar as an example. ln fast I loock at IBERLANT as being very helphul in that 
processo 
O: I would like to pose the folIowing questiono ln relation to the 
defense structures emerging in Europe, how can we articulate NATO with 
those defense structures, having in mind not only optimization but also 
rationalization regarding operational commands? 
A: I think the important thing in the process is to maintain flexibility 
and not create redundancies of bureaucracy or command structures. That is 
what I interpret as the way to have transparency between, for exemple, the 
Westhem European Union and NATO. 
ln the last year we have used forces that are committed to this alliance 
in a variety of ways that have benefitted alI of our countries, but that have 
not always responded under the NATO flag. As an example, in the Persian 
69 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
Gulf, we had representatives of our NATO alliances serving in the Gulf 
but not under a NATO flag. They were NATO forces but they got there 
under, sometimes their own independent national response to a UN resolution, 
sometimes under a collective response to the WEU, but when they got 
there they interacted and were credible forces because of the NATO 
training that they had dane. We also had NATO under NATO's flag, as 
I mentioned, performing surveillance against the potential threat for terrorism 
throughout the Mediterranean. And certainIy we sent the ACE's mobile 
forces representing Belgium, Italy and Germany to protect Turkey's interest 
in the Iraq crisis. We have also used forces from France and Belgium 
- Belgium's forces were the sarne forces that are committed to NATO - when 
they had a crisis in Africa. 
All of this is achievable if we remain flexible and understand that crisis 
response will have different applications from different perspectives. What 
is important, I think, is that we not try to duplicate the massive and yet 
effective infrastructures that we have co=itted from our nations and 
already exist in Brussels. We should be able to have transparency and 
thorough dialogue with the various leaderships to decide which is the best 
shopping menu to aplly to a particular crisis. I also believe that it is 
important for our entire world security even when the magnitude of the 
large threat goes away that we maintain the strength of the Atlantic link 
between North America and Europe and NATO is the way to do that. 
Q: AdmiraI, I am the Ambassador of Norway in Portugal and I think 
you gave us a brilliant outline of the challenges that are facing our Alliance, 
for which I want to thank you. There seems to be a, as you have said 
yourself very clearly, a very dramatic shift in the global security situation. 
( ... ) It seems that NATO, to an extent, will be assuming the role of policing 
the world in the future. And do you see, as an example, the integration of 
NATO in a -let's be very optimistic - in a United Nations peacekeeping 
force? Thank you, sir. 
A: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. First of all, I think I have a differenl 
perception of whal NATO's role is than as Ihal of police force. I do nol accept 
that role for NATO. I don'l Ihink it is proper and I do not think thal eilher 
NATO, nor my own country is a police force for world stability. And so 
I have seen no tendency within the NATO leadership that I have parlicipated 
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in with great pleasure for the last two and a half years, to accept, and I 
think properly so, the role of world policeman ar even area policeman. ln fact, 
NATO has not accepted an out-of-area role, which I assume could then start a 
linkage to that concept. 50 I don't believe that NATO has a role as world 
policeman nor should they. 
What I do believe is - and I think NA TO's responsibility has to 
remain focused and limited to what our objectives are - that this group 
of sixteen nations must communicate that there is solidarity, there is 
commitment to collective defense for any coalition Ihat chooses to callenge 
and threaten the security of Ihis unique group of nations. And in so doing, 
we stand for lhe support of international law, we stand for human rights, 
we stand for governments that have the voice and ability to change Ihose 
governments through the ballot box and not through the muzzle of a gun. And 
when Ihose elements that do exist around the world threaten our direct 
security interest we will respond in unity. 
Q: Admirai, I would like to pose a question regarding the Azores. ln 
1973, the Azores showed they were vitally important to lhe resupply of 
Israel and maintenance of the State of Israel. During the Gulf War, last 
year, the importance of lhe Azores was, perhaps, not as vital. The explanation 
I find lies in lhe time factor. While in 1973 there was a need for a very 
swift deployment of forces and resources - in a malter of days - now 
(during the Gulf War) Ihere were months to deploy the military power to 
begin Desert Storm. I would like to ask you, Admirai, in your capacity 
as a military commander, as an American military commander, if you 
consider that the Azores, in case of a crisis in the Middle East or in the 
Mediterranean, continue as important, I would say as vital, as they were 
in 1973. Thank you. 
A: As a military commander, I do consider that the Azores has extreme 
high value and strategic importance, not only to the mutual bilateral 
relationship between Portugal and the United States but to lhe interest 
of this alliance as we look to a multipolar, multi direccional world, because of 
their location and their abilit'y to respond East and West, North and South. 
And now, what needs to be also factored into the situation is that nothing is 
u1timate, 80 you have to define what is essential and what is a benefit. And 
then, you have to define where we and the realities of the world; and 50 I teU 
my people and who we interact with, that the realities are Ihat we are coming 
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down by 30 percent; the realities are that they are different fram 1973. My 
country has spent the last 20 years seeking an association with moderate Arab 
states trying to modify and find avenues of solutions to a very difficult, 
complex situation in the Middle East. II is not easy but the chemistry and 
the dynamics are different in 1992 than they were in 1973. And also, the 
presence and deployment of forces and the capabilities of those forces 
are different. 
What I do see is that we come down now without lhe massive threats 
presented by the bloc politics. We used to generate force leveis and our 
aclions based on lhe olher side, the magnitude, and the state of intentions 
of that threal. Now the fact of life is that in my country we generate our 
responsiveness based on the budget, and so we have to take a look to where 
the budget is driving, because it used to be that lhe threat drove the budget; 
now the budget drives the responsiveness of our armed forces. 
And so in those realities, if there is a conflict, I have to manage to lhe 
realities of my budgel. As a maritime commander that has spent the 
majority of my time in the Pacific, three years ago I would have said to 
you there is no way Ihat we could be out the Philippines, and on December 
12 of this year ali United States naval forces will be Philippines. Three 
years ago somebody would have said that was absolutely vital and essential 
to U. S. interests in the Pacific and that we could not do without iI. That 
was not a true statement then; it is not a true statement now. And there is 
nothing that is vital in that environment that can be taken in isolalion from 
the realities of the budget and the realities of the changing world around uso 
I am particularly interested in getting, as military commander, an 
acceptable, mutuaUy workable agreemenl. But there is nothing in the en· 
vironment today that cannot be worked around, and certain1y everything 
has to be worked within the realities of what we can afford. That is a 
problem in our country because we have such a tremendous deficit. We 
have got our Congress saying it is time we have our deficit spending under 
control, and the military commanders are being told to look at every avenue. 
This is nothing associated with the negotiations. We are looking at where 
we had ASW forces and if there isn't an ASW threat there, we cannot 
afford to have ASW forces, and we have to reaUocate those. Those types 
of the decisions are going on and they are very complexo 
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So, a short answer is, yes, they have strategic value not only for today 
but, I believe for tomorrow. Are they absolutely so vital that we can't do 
without them? The answer is: I don't know of anything that we cannot do 
without except for a credible nuclear deterrence, because we live in a 
nuclear threatening world and you must be able to deter that in order for 
your own peace and the world's peace. 
Leon A. Edney 
Admirai 
Supreme Al1ied Commander 
Atlantic 
Commander in Chief 
US AtIantic Command 
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